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e4Future
e4Future is a real world demonstrator of Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) charging technologies aiming to show
how electric vans and cars can support the UK grid and provide a profitable and sustainable solution
for business fleets. The project is funded under UK Research and Innovation by the Department
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and The Oce for Zero Emission
Vehicles (OZEV) and delivered through Innovate UK. e4Future is led by Nissan, in collaboration with
energy companies and academic institutions. Newcastle University leads the security work package
on the project and a task to understand customer attitudes towards .......V2G. In addition, Newcastle
University is building and simulating electricity distribution network models to understand impact
and benefits of .......V2G; and building a secure cloud based tool to automate collection and analysis of








The Active Building Center Research Programme (ABC-
RP) aims to address sustainable infrastructure to reduce
the carbon footprint of buildings to meet governmental
targets by 2050. The consortium researches innovative
ways and technologies to sustain high quality power
provision to customers while regulating ancillary services
in localised (small scale) grids. The vision is to create
ensembles of Active Buildings (ABs) acting as energy
peers that trade the surplus. They can energise their
surroundings to adjust to flexible demands to meet dynamic energy requirements. They are
equipped with responsive technologies and state-of-the-art controls that combine near real-time
decision making with remote management capabilities.
.....ABs have the ability to operate disconnected from the conventional grid and in islanded mode
(independent). The infrastructure combines massive quantities of Distributed Energy Resources
(DER), such as photo-voltaic, wind turbines, charge Energy Storage Systems (ESS) using large
batteries attached to the buildings, or using pre-existing electric vehicles located in charging areas.
Link to the project: https://abc-rp.com/.
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Acronyms
ACPO Association of Chief Police
Ocers of England, Wales and
Northern Ireland
BEV Battery Electric Vehicle
CA Certificate Authority
CAN Controller Area Network
CAV Connected and Autonomous
Vehicles
CCS Combined Charging System
CEC China Electricity Council
CPNI Centre for the Protection of
National Infrastructure
CPO Charge Point Operator
DER Distributed Energy Resources
DfT Department for Transport (UK)
DoS Denial of Service
DSO Distribution System Operator
ECU Electronic Control Units
EMS e-Mobility Services





GDPR General Data Protection
Regulation
HEV Hybrid Electric Vehicle
ICO Information Commissioner’s
Oce
IoT Internet of Things
ITS Intelligent Transport System
NIS Network & Information
Systems
NIST National Institute of Standards
and Technology
OCPP Open Charge Point Protocol





SAE Society of Automotive
Engineers
SIEM Security Information and Event
Management
SoC State of Charge
TCU Telematic Control Units
TLS Transport Layer Security
TSO Transmission System Operator
V2G Vehicle-to-Grid
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1 Executive Summary
Electric Vehicles (EVs) can help alleviate our reliance on fossil fuels for transport and
electricity systems. However, charging millions of EV batteries requires management to
prevent overloading the electricity grid and minimise costly upgrades that are ultimately
paid for by consumers.
Managed chargers, such as Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) chargers, allow control over the time,
speed and direction of charging. Such control assists in balancing electricity supply and
demand across a green electricity system and could reduce costs for consumers.
Smart and V2G chargers connect EVs to the power grid using a charging device which
includes a data connection to exchange information and control commands between
various entities in the EV ecosystem. This introduces data privacy concerns and is a
potential target for cyber-security attacks. Examples of threats include unauthorised access
to information (e.g. banking details), tampering (e.g energy used), and denial of service (e.g.
unavailability of the charger) among others. Therefore, the implementation of a secure
system is crucial to permit both consumers and electricity system operators to trust smart
charging and V2G.
In principle, we already have the technology needed for a connected EV charging
infrastructure to be securely enabled, borrowing best practices from the Internet and
industrial control systems. The main tools would be cryptographic algorithms (e.g. AES-256)
and protocols (e.g. TLS), digital signatures and certificates. To deploy cryptographic systems
on a widespread basis across multiple administrative domains, more work is required on
governance and operational procedures such as defining a trust framework, for example
a Public-Key Infrastructure, which is widely adopted on the Internet to securely exchange
confidential messages and authenticate relevant entities.
We must properly adapt the security technology to take into account the challenges
peculiar to the EV charging infrastructure. Challenges go beyond technical considerations
and other issues arise such as balancing trade-os between security and other desirable
qualities such as interoperability, scalability, crypto-agility, aordability and energy
eciency.
This document reviews security and privacy topics relevant to the EV charging ecosystem
with a focus on smart charging and V2G.
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CHAPTER 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1 Recommendations and Guidance
It is crucial to establish and adopt security requirements for the EV charging infrastructure
before mass uptake of EVs. Ensuring that an EV charging infrastructure, including smart
charging and V2G, is secure requires security measures and standards at multiple levels
from the charge point and electric vehicle through the charging infrastructure back oce
and grid operator. Guidance and recommendations are provided to help secure charging
infrastructure, electricity system and EV drivers.
Legend: Guidance Recommendation § • Section reference
§3
§4.1
Regulations that apply to EV charging infrastructure have been introduced and
some are under development. Relevant players need to understand their roles
and responsibilities in terms of existing applicable regulations such as GDPR
for data protection and the Security of Network & Information Systems (NIS)
regulations1. Additionally, upcoming legislation on EV smart charging 2 in the UK
will include cyber security requirements. Under the sponsorship of BEIS and OZEV,
the British Standards Institution (BSI) is expected to publish in 2021 two publicly
available specifications (PAS) 1878 and 1879 on energy smart appliances 3. These
specifications include security requirements that, if adopted, can help secure
smart and V2G charging infrastructure.
§4
Encryption of communications and the anonymisation of data should be
mandatory to ensure privacy and protection of the EV ecosystem. We envision
that an enforcement authority such as the Oce for Product Safety and Standards
could collaborate with the Information Commissioner’s Oce (ICO) to provide
data privacy guidance to relevant actors in the EV ecosystem and, when necessary,
enforce fines for failure to comply with data protection laws.
§5
Several open communication protocols and standards have been developed to
manage distributed energy resources and smart appliances including EV chargers.
Some are generic (e.g. OpenADR) while others are specifically designed for EVs
and charging infrastructure (e.g. OCPP, ISO15118, among others). Most of these
protocols include provisions to meet cyber-security guidelines.




Innovation/energy-smart-appliances-programme/ Smart Charging Webinar: Nina Klein & James Morgan,
BEIS, UK Cyber Security policy for Smart Energy - https://youtu.be/b8-fYqwe1d8.
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continued from previous page
§3.2
Publicly exposed devices should not allow unprotected physical access, e.g.
deploy tamper-proof chargers, and protect against remote attacks, e.g. through




Devices should be provided with appropriate memory and computational power
to minimise insecure infrastructure or costly hardware updates. Experience from
other domains suggests that communication protocols are likely to change or be
replaced and security keys could grow in size to oer stronger security guarantees.
§3
Technical documents are available to help develop secure charging infrastructure,
namely documents published by the European Network for Cyber Security (ENCS)
in collaboration with ElaadNL. These include a security test plan for EV charging
stations and a proposed security architecture for charging infrastructure4.
§3.2
Security testing and assurance, as well as certifications and compliance tests are
essential. An example of a certification programme is the ENERGY STAR®5 Program
Requirements for Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment6.
§3
§3.3
Security frameworks should be adopted and attack databases should be
consulted to safeguard the EV ecosystem. Organisations, e.g. point manufacturers,
CPOs and aggregators, should carry out risk assessments and threat modellings to
understand and manage security risks. Example of security framework is the NIST
Cybersecurity Framework which provides organisations with guidance on how to
prevent, detect, and respond to cyber attacks. Example of an attack database is
MITRE’s Adversarial Tactics, Techniques and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK®).
continued on next page
4https://www.elaad.nl/projects/cybersecurity/
5ENERGY STAR®is a US government-backed symbol that helps customers choose energy ecient products.
6https://www.energystar.gov/products/spec/electric_vehicle_supply_equipment_pd
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continued from previous page
§5
Alignment with international activities will be crucial. A collaboration between
industry, government and international partners is fundamental to ensure the
UK is aligned with international markets. The publication of the European Cyber
Security Act has triggered the work on the Network Code on energy-specific cyber
security which is currently being developed7. Network Codes have legal status
within the European Union, and the UK has implemented previous codes. A large
part of the European market adopting common standards and frameworks for
EV charging cyber security would mean that adopting dierent approaches could
potentially make the UK market less attractive to manufacturers and operators.
§5.3
A platform to bring together emerging key players, e.g. charge point manufac-
turers, aggregators, . . . , is recommended with the goal of sharing security issues,
agreeing on requirements, developing capabilities and liaising with international
activities. Such platform could bring mobility and energy industries together to
support the design of a PKI platform for EV charging and identify options to field
such a platform in real world (e.g. one trust authority vs multi-regional trust au-
thorities). It is worth noting that there are on-going European and international
PKI platform design and development projects and it is not clear, to the best of our
knowledge, if UK stakeholders are involved in these eorts.
As in other contexts, the evolution of the security for the EV charging infrastructure is
already a game between hackers and secure systems, with vulnerabilities and patches,
mixed with compliance with local and international policies. Thus, working tightly with
security experts is fundamental to ensure that devices and processes put in place are
properly secured.
7https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/1st_interim_report_final.pdf
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2 Introduction
Electric vehicles (EVs) can improve air quality and reduce our carbon emissions. To support
the adoption of EVs, several countries announced plans to end the sale of petrol and diesel
cars (by 2030 in the UK)8.
With millions of EVs forecasted to be on the road in the coming years, charging their
batteries needs to be managed to prevent overloading the electricity grid and minimise
costly upgrades that are ultimately paid for by consumers9.
Unmanaged charging is still prevalent, where the battery of the EV will begin charging as
soon as it is connected to the charging station until it is fully charged.
However, new managed charging technologies such as smart chargers and vehicle to grid
(V2G) technologies are being introduced. Electric vehicles, plugged using these new charging
technologies, can help balance supply and demand across a green electricity system and
reduce costs for the consumer10.
Smart chargers and V2G connect an EV to the electricity grid using a charging device which
includes a data connection to exchange information and control signals. Both charging
technologies would ensure that the vehicle is charged to meet driving requirements which
the user can set, usually through a customer mobile application.
Smart chargers can manage the time of charging and the speed of charging (i.e. power rate).
For example, charging can start a couple of hours after the EV is plugged and it doesn’t need
to happen at full power. Smart charging can minimise grid congestion by avoiding charging
8Dempsey, N., Hinson, S., 2021. House of Commons Library: Electric vehicles and infrastructure. https:
//commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7480/
9Neaimeh M, Wardle R, Jenkins AM, Yi J, Hill G, Lyons PF, Hübner Y, Blythe PT, Taylor PC. A probabilistic
approach to combining smart meter and electric vehicle charging data to investigate distribution network
impacts. Applied Energy. 2015 Nov 1;157:688-98. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0306261915001944
10Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS), 2020. Energy white pa-
per: Powering our net zero future.https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
energy-white-paper-powering-our-net-zero-future; Smart Charging Webinar: The cyber security of
smart metering and how it can be applied to EV charging. Daryl Flack, BEIS https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=JM7Teu_B96E&ab_channel=SupergenEnergyNetworksHub
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at peak times (7-9AM and 4-7PM in the UK) and/or make use of excess electricity generated
by solar panels or grid electricity imported during cheaper periods.
A V2G charger is similar to a smart charger in that it can also manage the time and speed
at which charging takes place. In addition, a V2G charger allows switching the direction of
charging by allowing EVs to sell energy back to the grid when it is most needed, or most
expensive, such as at times of peak demand.
2.1 An overview of the Smart Charging and V2G ecosystem
Electric vehicles managed through Smart chargers or V2G chargers can provide services
to the building/home (behind the meter services); the neighbourhood/local electricity
networks (distribution system operator, DSO, services) and to the whole system/region









Installing Smart chargers or V2G chargers makes sense at locations where vehicles are
routinely parked for a long period of time such as residential and workplace locations, see
Figure 2.1 on the following page. When cars are plugged for a long period of time, then there
will be a flexibility to manage the time and speed of charge and in the case of V2G manage
charging and discharging of the battery while prioritising the users’ driving requirements.
11For more information on vehicle grid services: Andersen, P.B., Toghroljerdi, S.H., Sørensen, T.M.,
Christensen, B.E., Morell Lodberg Høj, J.C., Zecchino, A., 2019. Parker Project Final Report. https://
parker-project.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Parker_Final-report_v1.1_2019.pdf
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Figure 2.1: Typical charging locations for private passenger BEVs – adapted from Danish
Electric Vehicle Alliance, DTU (2019) Sådan skaber Danmark grøn infrastruktur til én million
elbiler.
home work other filling station





 ≤ 22 kW
 50 to 350 kW
≥ 350 kWCHARGING
2.2 Securing the Web of Energy: The importance of Privacy
and Cybersecurity for charging stations
Smart charging and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) charging technologies connect an EV to the
electricity grid using a charging device which includes a data connection and ensures
the exchange of information and control commands between various entities in the EV
ecosystem including charge point, charge point operators, grid network operators, among
others.
Any connected infrastructure is a potential target for cyber-security attacks, with motives
including information theft, cyber-warfare 12, or organised crime13.
As such, we need to ensure the cyber security of these connected devices and the entities
involved in operating them to prevent threats impacting both the consumers and the
electricity system as a whole.
Moreover, privacy of users should be considered. Sharing users’ data by default without
engaging the user is risky as they might resist participating in managed charging initiatives.
This is specifically relevant to users who do not trust “smart” systems and could resist using
them. As an example, using charging points could give away user location, a perennial
challenge with services depending on users’ location. Consequently, an EV charging
ecosystem should consider techniques and processes to ensure user anonymity.
12e.g. attack against the power grid in Ukraine, during which 250,000 homes were cut o power for 6 hours.
13e.g. WannaCry ransomware attack that paralysed critical infrastructure, such as the UK NHS, asking for
ransom money to prevent the irreversible deletion of crucial files.
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3 Security of the EV Charging
Infrastructure
The US National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework
provides organisations with guidance on how to prevent, detect, and respond to cyber at-
tacks. NIST has categorised high-level, strategic view of the lifecycle of an organization’s
management of cybersecurity risk into five cybersecurity functions that are not synchro-
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safeguards to ensure 
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regarding a detected 
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adapted from an original picture by DELL
h�ps://infocus.delltechnologies.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Strengthen-Security-with-NIST-Cybersecurity-Framework-fig2-600x338.jpg
In this section, we analyse how each function can be instantiated in the context of an
organisation involved in the EV charging ecosystem. Of course, this is a continuous process:
new standards, protocols and policies are going to appear that regulate this ecosystem.
Nonetheless, the hardware shipped with chargers and cars that currently circulate is
not obviously updatable to newer technologies or policies, and may become legacy.
For instance, the firmware and software of a legacy device cannot be updated to let the
14https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework;https://www.cpni.gov.uk/system/files/documents/b0/69/
CPNI_Passport_to_Good_Security.pdf and https://www.cisecurity.org/cybersecurity-tools/
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hardware work in the new required way. For example, the devices might not have enough
memory to store stronger secrets, or the processors may be not powerful enough to carry
out stronger cryptographic operations, or else the communication channel cannot transfer
more than some small amount of bits per seconds.
The (ENCS), in collaboration with ElaadNL, provides some guidelines for a future-proof
design for EV charging devices15. Security issues with legacy hardware and backward
compatibility are not peculiar to the V2G ecosystem, but they represent a security
dimension that we strongly recommend not to overlook.
3.1 Identify
The Identify function is perhaps the most crucial as it requires assessing the cybersecurity
risk faced by the organisation. The risk of an individual cybersecurity event is given by the
likelihood of that event multiplied by its impact. The risk faced by the organisation is the
aggregation of the risk of all possible cybersecurity events.
The first challenge in computing risk is to list all possible events. Unfortunately, there is no
method that guarantees to be exhaustive, and the traditional approach consists in breaking
down the problem in several categories of desired security properties such as the well-
established CIA triad: confidentiality, integrity and availability.
availabilityconfidentiality
integrity
In a nutshell, confidentiality ensures that information
shall only be readable by the intended recipients (which
could include processing systems) and protects it from
unauthorised third parties. Integrity ensures that any
modification can only be done by authorised agents.
Availability ensures the services oered by the system
respond to the queries of the user within an expected
time frame (i.e. available when needed).
Confidentiality, integrity and availability are core
properties; yet there are additional desirable properties
such as authentication, non-repudiation and auditability.
Authentication means that a particular identified party is
not impersonating another. Non-repudiation means that
if some action is performed by an identified party (e.g. agreeing to the terms of a contract),
this can be proven later and cannot be denied. Auditability means that a trustworthy
log describing how information has been used is available (e.g. important for forensic
purposes)16.
15https://www.elaad.nl/projects/cybersecurity/
16Fall, Kevin R., and W. Richard Stevens. TCP/IP illustrated,
volume 1: The protocols. Addison-Wesley, 2011.
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Focusing on the core properties, the identification of cybersecurity events can therefore be
done by first focusing on all events targeting confidentiality, then those targeting integrity,
and finally those targeting availability. More specific categories have been used in threat
modelling, such as the STRIDE model.
It is necessary to first identify all potential attack vectors and attack surfaces. Some
examples of attacks on EVs and EV chargers (and the issues fixed) are presented17. Figure 3.1
illustrates attack vectors in the EV ecosystem. Following this, a threat modelling18 exercise
needs to be undertaken for every attack to identify the various potential scenarios and
threat actors, followed by an analysis of the impact of each threat. The key challenges
facing this complex ecosystem of EVs, V2G chargers and third party operators include:
• physical limitations of devices and communication channels;
• heterogeneity, scale, and ad-hoc nature of threats;
• authentication and identity management;
• authorisation and access control; and
• implementation, updating, responsibility, and accountability19.
Figure 3.1: Possible attack vectors in the EV Ecosystem. Adapted from: Mike Nelson, DigiCert
& Oscar Marcia, Eonti Inc. - Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for electric vehicles, https:
//youtu.be/nEBJzPVZNd0.
Charging station
Electric vehicle (EV) User Mobility provider OEM (Hardware/Software)












17Smart Charging Webinar: Andrew Tierney, Pen Test Partners, Trust and interoperability in Automotive -
https://youtu.be/JP2cQX1WHko
18SAE (2016). J3061: Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems, http://standards.sae.
org/j3061_201601/
19Maple, C., 2017. Security and privacy in the internet of things. Journal of Cyber Policy, 2(2), pp.155-184,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23738871.2017.1366536
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The second challenge in computing risk is to identify
the likelihood and impact of a possible cybersecurity
event. Each event might expose the individual users, the
company, their customer and the system. The impact of
such events could be generalised in three major areas:
physical, social and cyber. In general, the damages
identified in those areas are eventually assessed in risks
and severity reports, and relate to an economical or
personal loss of the victim and to a benefit gained by the
attacker. So it is important to take into consideration the
balance between the cost to carry out the attack and the
benefit gained by its perpetrators, to avoid unnecessary
costs of overly securing systems.
Physical impact
Attacks20 that have a direct or indirect physical impact to victims can aim to
• compromise devices through physical access,
• break hardware of devices, or
• provoke hazards that put in danger the health (or the life) of users.
Cyber impact
Attacks often aim to collect private data, e.g. encryption private keys, bank account
numbers, contact lists, profile credentials and preferences, to be sold to companies that
profit from such data or organise attacks on a larger scale. In general, the cyber impact of
such attacks does not break hardware but may leave the operating system in an unstable or
ill state that requires manual intervention.
Social impact
Attacks can aim to slander or expose the private life of victims, or in the case of companies,
to decrease the amount of trust among their actual or potential customers. These kinds of
attacks may simply manipulate the outcome of human behaviour (social hacking) without
the need to directly exploit vulnerabilities of protocols and devices.
20Smart Charging Webinars: Dr Ahamad Atamli, Cyber security: When IoT is in everything - https://
youtu.be/zWmMqQCwfJI; Dr Xavier Bellekens, Cybersecurity in the vehicular industry - https://youtu.be/
OfMyHb2w6M0.
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In the table below, we summarise possible attacks according to the security concepts of
confidentiality, integrity and availability, and the impact of attacks in terms of physical
impact, cyber impact or social impact. An example from the table considers DoS attacks:
these are attacks carried out with dierent techniques with the common goal to provoke
a discontinuity or a delay in the service, thus undermining availability. For the most part,
the impact of such attacks to the communication network can put some devices in a state
that requires a fresh restart or drain their battery, and can have an impact on the amount of
trust on a company from the customers who can appreciate the reduction or lack of service.




























Attack type Specific target(optional) Security Impact Example
Denial of
Service (DoS)
Communication broken either at
aggregator level or broader
Delay attack Power requests at incorrect timing maycause breakdowns
Replay attack Inconveniently replaying powerrequests may cause breakdowns
Snooping
Eavesdropping insecure
communications may let the attacker
link messages to the same user,
therefore tracking, stalking, or stealing
of private information
Sybil attack Aggregator Copy ID tokens to multiply energycharge for free
Impersonation EV, aggregator Steal energy from either directions
Man-in-the-
middle
Messages can be tampered, i.e.
charging decisions can be subverted
Repudiation EV Denial of power to legitimate EVs
EV misbehave Aggregator,billing party
Wrong information may entail wrong
decisions
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3.2 Protect
The Protect function focuses on protecting product assets and information, hardware
and software from cyber threats, including the cyber protection of embedded electronic
controller units (ECUs) in automotive electronics, securing design of the architecture
(segmentation, boundaries protection), and securing information like payment information
and vehicle identification.
Cyber
Cyber security technical requirements should cover the supply chain. For example,
establishment of guidelines for cyber security during the procurement phase, to guide
the customer through the security measures of the purchased EV or charge point. The
cyber security requirements for third parties involved in the smart or V2G charging process
such as building an energy management system charging station should also be defined.
Dierent entities in the V2G ecosystem can store private information that belong to owners,
e.g. the EV driver, or customers, e.g. an aggregator or a charge point operator. Companies
may store such information in databases and part of the information may be exchanged
with other entities.
From the security perspective, the databases or files with private information need to be:
stored in encrypted drives to avoid information theft (think also of picking up a disposed
charger), and be isolated/inaccessible to other co-existing software. The operating systems
and firmware of devices shall enact standard security measures, as strong and random
passwords (and not reconstructable from serial numbers) and avoid backdoors, adopt a
proper implementation of access control of files and other resources, and they must allow
updates from verified sources, e.g. signed by manufacturers. When part of such information
needs to be exchanged, the entities shall first establish a secure channel, e.g. through
secure protocols as TLS, then exchange messages securely. Security of communication is
discussed more in detail in the next dedicated section.
Procurement of third-party components can also be logged into a Digital Bill of Materials
(DBOM). The diversity of the global automotive and energy supply chain makes it dicult
to know the provenance of every chipset, device and connected component required.
Furthermore, the current state of the supply chain does not provide information on the
buyer, the assembler and the reseller. In an ever more connected world, such information
is critical to prevent cyber-attacks and identify threats before an asset is on the market.
DBOMs can take the form of a shared ledger with or without a central authority collecting
information on the journey of every component ranging from chipsets and cargo identifiers
to the company assembling the smart chargers. It is therefore key for the DBOM to be
immutable while providing adequate information for traceability. The same concept can
be applied for the software written for every component ranging from firmware to the user
interface through a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM).
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Physical
Physical security is also considered to be a concern in the V2G charging process. Several
devices are physically exposed to potential attackers, e.g. cars are parked in public spaces
and some of the chargers and charging cables are publicly placed (e.g. parking lots,
kerbside parking) with little or no extensive physical security measures applied .
The internal memories and devices must be protected against cloning and tampering at
least in the same way we protect electrical boxes on public spaces. Managed EV charging
technologies such as V2G adds an additional security requirement, as private information
will be exchanged between vehicles, chargers, and other entities. Thus, the communication
links need to be protected as well as the power links. Particular attention is required if
and when wireless charging is introduced to ensure that cars are protected from being
discharged by bogus or cloned chargers, as they would not need to access a cabled outlet
(that could be key-locked).
Cyber security requirements must consider all entities that are involved in this process,
starting from the EV charge point but also the customer, the EV, the charge point operator
and other third party operators such as electric companies involved in the integration of
electric vehicles into the grid.
The Protect function also includes part of the design of both power and communication
networks, and strongly refers to the risk and security requirements covered by the Identify
function. It relates to the system configuration in terms of their capability and their
topological or geographical displacement. At this level, it is important to implement what
is required to provide availability, e.g. redundant power and communication links or
distributed databases, as well as what physical security measures and what communication
protocols are best suited to protect confidentiality and integrity of exchanged messages
or stored secrets. Cybersecurity analysis at this level can be done with the aid of tools.
Literature counts several of such tools that can be applied to analyse the EV charging
infrastructure: they are usually extensions or bespoke applications of tools previously used
to analyse cybersecurity of industrial systems connected to both the Internet and the power
grid. They can be used to analyse manually designed attack scenarios and, to some extent,
incident responses. Those tools can help only when designing the architecture, but can
hardly capture vulnerabilities of a deployed system as it cannot capture all its aspects. It is
best practice to establish at this level what resources are required for a future-proof device
in terms of resources to allow for security updates and other compliance updates that can
relate to foreseeable evolution of policies. An example of a certification programme is the
ENERGY STAR®Program Requirements for Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment21.
Once the architecture is decided, next is its implementation, i.e. the practical construction
of devices (hardware) and the implementation of algorithms and protocols (software)
both respecting regulations imposed by governmental, international or local policies
and standards. Security practices at this stage are the analysis of the composition of
21https://www.energystar.gov/products/spec/electric_vehicle_supply_equipment_pd
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security protocols, their implementation, and the security of both device systems22 and
the communication networks. As formal verification of implementations is very complex
and time consuming, security best practices here are often empirical: penetration testing,
constant updating of operating systems (and firmwares) and their configuration against the
latest security recommendations, e.g. by NIST.
3.3 Detect, Respond, and Recover
The EU Security of Network & Information Systems Regulations (NIS Regulations) have
been introduced in the UK in 2018. It has been reviewed in May 2020, where they could
preliminary assess that it incentivised operators to improve their security but long-term
benefits are still to be understood. It provides legal measures to boost the overall level of
security (both cyber and physical resilience) of network and information systems that are
critical for the provision of the essential services of transport and energy among others.
In particular, they establish enforcement and penalties for operators of essential services
not matching appropriate security measures. Directly citing from them, the operator
must take appropriate and proportionate measures to prevent and minimise the impact
of incidents aecting the security of the network and information systems used for the
provision of an essential service, with a view to ensuring the continuity of those services23.
The three functions of Detect, Respond and Recover are strictly related and include all the
necessary tasks required to keep security and incident-responses active and eective once
the whole architecture is up and running.
Detecting cyber-threats against electrical vehicles and the infrastructure is an herculean
task given the large spread of the attack surface24. Integrating cyber-security to an existing
and evolving infrastructure requires a considerable amount of operational planning.
From a human perspective cyber-ranges can be used to simulate a representative
infrastructure and associated cyber-attacks against the power grid to evaluate and train
operators to identify, detect and respond in a timely manner. From an end-user perspective
it is essential to educate the users to a variety of risks, which remain to be identified (e.g.
Connecting a vehicle to open wireless hotspots in the vicinity of charging stations).
From a technical standpoint, EV and the grid must encompass a range of traditional
measures and protection devices such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, intrusion
prevention systems, disabling default credentials, encryption of communications, etc.
22It would be pointless to use any form of encryption in communications between (flawed) systems that
allow attackers to retrieve private keys.
23https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2018/506/contents
24Marko Wolf, André Weimerskirch, and Christof Paar. Security in automotive bus systems. In Workshop on
Embedded Security in Cars, pages 1–13. Bochum, 2004.
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Emerging techniques such as digital twinning to monitor the state of the system or cyber-
deception can also be used to trick the attacker into believing they are interacting with
a real system while providing them with false information. Cyber-deception also allows
for a low false positive rate and modus operandi information gathering for the recovery
phase25. Information from the various cyber-security devices should be aggregated through
a Security information and event management (SIEM) for analysis by a security operator.
Alongside the deployment of cyber-security components, the Techniques, Tactics and
Procedures (TTPs) of attackers should also be analysed and conclusions drawn from
previous attacks. This can be achieved by MITRE’s Adversarial Tactics, Techniques and
Common Knowledge (ATT&CK®) framework. As shown in Figure 3.2, a list of TTPs employed
by attackers in actual attacks over Enterprise systems (note there is also a mobile structure
in the framework). The ATT&CK matrix provides information on the modus operandi of
attackers to achieve persistence and disrupt an infrastructure. The matrix further allows
to identify critical components and provide guidelines on “why”, “how”, and “what” to
protect to alleviate a cyber attack. It is worth mentioning that ATT&CK lists only reported
incidents, so security ocers and administrators should take other protective measures to
complement their approaches.
Establishing testing phases through penetration testing is also good practice to evaluate
the security of services and components however, it is key to understand the potential
25https://www.lupovis.io
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Figure 3.3: Cyber recovery operational framework. Links emphasise the most relating or
interdepending points.
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consequences of the test. For example, it is recommended to test critical operational
components oine as testing may lead to undefined behaviour under stress.
Quick recovery from a cyber-attack is essential and can be planned with the cyber recovery
operational framework. Figure 3.3 depicts the cyber recovery operational framework which
indicates the step to take ahead and during a cyber attack to recover the infrastructure
quickly while ensuring business continuity26.
After a cyber-attack, it is essential to collect information on the attacker to quickly respond
to the following question “who”, “what”, “when” and “where” through digital forensics.
During the digital forensics procedure it is essential to follow the ACPO guidelines27 which
provide a set of guidelines for collecting digital evidence after a crime. Information can be
gathered from the intrusion detection systems, firewalls and cyber-deception tooling as
well as the Security Information and Event Management (SIEM). Furthermore, Information
from the physical components such as the charging stations and other components
involved in the cyber-attack should also be secured.
As a final remark, the V2G technology is expected to coexist along with other technologies
to form smart grids and smart cities which are in constant evolution. As such, revisiting each
and all phases is required to keep the infrastructure in a secure status.
26https://cyberframework.c-mric.com/
27https://athenaforensics.co.uk/acpo-guidelines-for-computer-forensics/
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4 Privacy in the EV Charging
Infrastructure
In addition to ensuring the security of the EV ecosystem, it is of utmost importance to
consider data privacy. In this section, we discuss data privacy in the context of IoT devices
that could be applied to V2G.
V2G services have the potential to add up to the already existing unrelated services oered
to end-users through the Internet, e.g. directions on maps.
Users of Internet services, such as directions on maps, familiarised themselves with the
tradeo of providing private data (i.e. geolocation) in return of an improved personalised
service (e.g. trac-aware directions, locations of nearby restaurants, etc.). Any restriction
enforced by the user, e.g. disabling location sharing will be reflected in either the
impossibility to use some service or the limited quality of the same.
In a similar way, there is a tradeo involved if EV users participate in V2G services to reduce
their transport cost. To allow an optimal V2G services, users would trust the V2G operator
to manage their charging events and track their driving patterns (i.e. Time of arrival,
departure). There is also personally identifiable information (PII) involved such as the name,
banking info. Consequently protecting V2G communication is a key requirement, including








Privacy becomes even more important when
the operating system of a car would be
linked to the operating system of a phone
and allows for augmented monitoring and
control of the users’ activity. For example,
the car/charger can extract the calendar
information about the time and destination
of upcoming trips from the user’s phone
and accordingly set the charging profile.
Depending on the vehicle and manufacturer,
the personal data required to make the
services work varies. For example, most mobile applications by manufacturers (e.g. Tesla,
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Audi, Toyota and others) require read-and-write permissions to the user’s calendar. An
important caveat on understanding permissions in mobile applications is that, even
though some permissions are required to perform operations, that does not imply that
all permitted operations will be actually done: for example, if an application is granted
calendar access, it will unlikely release all your schedule to some third party by email
without your knowledge, yet it means it might. This reconciles with the importance of using
open source applications, where anybody can potentially inspect the source code and
see what for or where private information is collected and under what circumstances. We
strongly recommend the anonymisation and aggregation of data to protect users’ privacy.
Sharing users’ data by default without engaging the user is risky because they might resist
participating in smart charging and V2G initiatives. Some users, indeed, distrust “smart”
systems and could resist migrating to them. To draw a comparison to smart meters roll-out
in several countries, previous work indicated that overlooked non-technical factors such as
social and ethical considerations could have a considerable impact on the success of the
smart meter roll-out and a future smart energy system.
4.1 Existing Privacy Regulations and Guidance
In addition to gaining users’ trust, new government regulation and guidance emphasise
the importance of data privacy requirements, which should be applied to connected smart
charging systems. Regulation and guidance include the GDPR regulation; the guidance on
Internet of Things (IoT) and the guidance on Principles of cyber security for connected and
automated vehicles.
First, GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) was enforced May 2018, with stronger
rights for end-users with respect to their personal data28. Specifically, the users have the
right to: be informed, access, rectify or erase their data, restrict or object processing, data
portability and other rights related to automated decision making and profiling.
These end-users’ rights detailed in GDPR are emphasised in a government publication
on the Internet of Things (IoT)29. The document highlights the requirement to ensure that
personal data is processed and protected in accordance with data protection law.
The document indicates that device manufacturers and IoT service providers must provide
consumers with clear and transparent information about how their data is being used,
by whom, and for what purposes, for each device and service. Moreover, users should be
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In more detail, where personal data is processed on the basis of consumers’ consent, this
must be validly and lawfully obtained, with those consumers being given the opportunity
to withdraw it at any time. Consumers should also be provided with guidance on how to
securely set up their device, as well as how they may eventually securely dispose of it.
While the document does not specify electric vehicles, EV charging would fit the definition
of a connected IoT device and the actors involved in EV charging should adhere to this
government’s code of practice for consumer internet of things. In particular and when
applicable, EV ecosystem actors would need to be mindful of:
“ Providing clear and transparent information to consumers about what personaldata devices and services process, the organisations that process this data, andthe lawful basis on which the processing takes place. ”
“ Building privacy and security into the product lifecycle from the design phase,and ensure these are continued throughout. ”
“ Ensuring that appropriate technical and organisational measures are in placeto protect any personal data, including processes to ensure the confidentiality,integrity, availability and resilience of processing systems and services, andregular testing to ensure the eectiveness of such measures. ”The Information Commissioner’s Oce (ICO) is the UK’s data protection regulator, providing
advice and guidance to organisations and consumers and, where necessary, undertaking
appropriate and proportionate enforcement action. For example, ICO fined Talk Talk a
penalty of £400,000 for failing to properly protect customer data from a cyber-attack.
ICO’s investigation found that the attack on the company could have been prevented in
Talk Talk has taken basic steps to protect customers’ information30. More specifically to
the automotive sector, DfT in partnership with the Centre for the Protection of National
Infrastructure (CPNI) and the Centre for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles published
8 principles for obtaining good cyber security within the automotive sector including.
Principle 7 relates to data privacy and states that: “the storage and transmission of data is
secure and can be controlled”. In detail:
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“ Personally identifiable data must be managed appropriately. This includes:• what is stored (both on and o the ITS / CAV system)• what is transmitted
• how it is used
• the control the data owner has over these processes
• where possible, data that is sent to other systems is sanitised.
Principle 7.2 ”
“ Users are able to delete sensitive data held on systems and connected systems.Principle 7.3 ”
Principle 7 of the guidance on the key principles of vehicle cyber security for connected and
automated vehicles is aligned with the text of GDPR and the guidance on IoT. This would
suggest that relevant actors in the EV ecosystem would need to be mindful of data privacy
issues, with the ICO, data regulator, providing guidance and when necessary enforcing fines
for failure to comply with data protection laws.
As a final remark on the near future of regulation, the publication of the European Cyber
Security Act has triggered the work on the Network Code on energy-specific cyber security
which is currently being developed. Network Codes have legal status within the European
Union, and the UK has implemented previous codes.
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5 Communication protocols linking
various EV ecosystem entities
Communication protocols provide a set of rules and guidelines to facilitate communication
and data exchange between two or more entities. A protocol would define the interface
between two or more interacting entities to ensure compatibility between these dierent
systems31.
Management of BEV charging requires increasing need for coordination and communication
between various mobility and energy entities, see Figure 5.1. Specifically, informational and
control objects need to be exchanged between BEV chargers and entities to allow electricity
system support, such as electricity demand peak reduction. Information exchanged such
as car identification, battery state of charge (SoC), battery size, energy required for the
next trip would flow up across entities. Based on that information and on information
collected from the electricity system infrastructure (e.g. frequency, current, and voltage
data), chargers’ power set points are determined and sent down to control the charging
process, ensuring proper integration of vehicles into the electricity grid.
Communication protocols linking various entities in the EV ecosystem can be divided into
front-end and back-end protocols32.
Front-end protocols define the link between car and charge point and specify requirements
for plugs, charging topologies (on-board/o-board charging equipment; conductive/induc-
tive charging), communication, safety and cyber-security. Protocols such as CHAdeMO and
ISO15118-20 allow bidirectional power flow (i.e. V2G) between the car and a charger.
Back-end protocols, emphasising communication and cyber-security requirements, define
the link between charge point and a third party operator. Some of these open protocols are
OCPP, IEC63110, OpenADR, EEBus and IEEE2030.5.
31Ferwerda, R., Bayings, M., Van der Kam, M. and Bekkers, R., 2018. Advancing E-roaming in Europe: towards
a single “language” for the European charging infrastructure. World Electric Vehicle Journal, 9(4), p.50.https:
//www.mdpi.com/2032-6653/9/4/50
32Schmutzler J, Andersen CA, Wietfeld C (2013) Evaluation of OCPP and IEC 61850 for smart charging electric
vehicles. In: 2013 world electric vehicle Symposium and exhibition (EVS27), pp 1–12
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Figure 5.1: Various EV ecosystem entities connected by communication protocols - more
information on entities and protocols can be found at https://energyinformatics.
springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s42162-020-0103-1.
informational object flows to the top of the chain (e.g. ID, SoC, battery info, next trip info)
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A brief security review of some of these protocols is presented below. We start with two
front-end protocols CHAdeMO and ISO15118, then we review four back-end protocols,
namely OCPP, OpenADR, IEEE 2030.5 and EEBus.
5.1 Front-end Protocols: EV to Charger
5.1.1 CHAdeMO
CHAdeMO is a DC charging protocol enabling V2G operations for electric vehicles, i.e.
charging and discharging of their internal battery. CHAdeMO lacks secure communication
features and it relies on CAN communication which is described below.
Vehicles that plug to chargers with CHAdeMO expose their CAN bus to the (untrusted)
charger. Therefore, security concerns on the CHAdeMO are mostly related to the unen-
crypted communication through the CAN bus, and in particular to the ability of a mali-
cious entity to control or program other ECUs exposed by the CAN bus. CHAdeMO follows
the standard IEC 61851-23:2014 for the actual charging and discharging operations, and fol-
lows the standard IEC 61851-24:2014 for the digital communication between the car and the
charger.
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In 2019, CHAdeMO announced that it is co-developing the next generation ultra-fast EV
charging standard called ChaoJi in collaboration with China Electricity Council (CEC) who is
behind the GB/T standard for EV charging in China.
Security of ChaoJi/CHAdeMO 3.0
Currently, ChaoJi is not implementing any security for the communication and will still
communicate using the CAN bus (not only for retro-compatibility purposes), following the
IEC 61851-24. However, they recognise the importance of security and plan towards a unified
communication protocol that would run over Ethernet and TCP/IP, and would follow a PKI
infrastructure and employ TLS, similarly to how TLS is already used in the Internet.
CAN bus
CAN (Controller Area Network) is a message-based protocol introduced in the ’80s by Robert
BOSCH GmbH that allows electronic components of a car to communicate with each other’s
applications without requiring a central computer. Being a low-level protocol, messages
are exchanged by ECUs unencrypted; CAN does not support any security features. In most
implementations, applications are expected to deploy their own security mechanisms.
Some functions that use the CAN bus are safety-critical, e.g. firmware updates or brakes,
and are protected with passwords. However, modern cars are equipped with hundreds of
ECUs, and their coexistence with TCUs (Telematic Control Units), connected to the Internet,














on-board diagnosis (and data collection)
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Numerous examples of security concerns and attacks on the CAN have been described 33
34 35 36 37 38 . A devastating remote attack on Jeep shown by Miller and Valasek39 got the
attention of companies on the seriousness of CAN bus attacks, even though details of
previous attacks on dierent vehicles were already published 40 41 .
5.1.2 ISO 15118
ISO 15118 is another front end protocol connecting electric vehicles to charging infrastruc-
ture with some additional capabilities such as Plug&Charge and extensive security mea-
sures. One main feature of ISO 15118 is using digital certificates42 to secure the communica-
tion. The protocol also allows automated authentication and authorization. ISO 15118 is part
of the Combined Charging System (CCS), which is a set of hardware and software standards
for charging systems.
ISO 15118-20 is currently under development, expected by the end of 2021, and will define
a use case for bidirectional power transfer. There already exist demonstrations using ISO
15118-20 for V2G (e.g. Renault).
Security
An important dierence between CHAdeMO and ISO 15118 is that the former makes
direct use of the CAN bus and ECUs internal to the car, while the latter establishes the
requirements of the Physical and the Data link layers. Also ISO15118 suggests43 the adoption
mature security protocols, i.e. TLS44 while CHAdeMO doesn’t (but expected in future versions
of its successor ChaoJi).
33Karl Koscher, Alexei Czeskis, Franziska Roesner, Shwetak Patel, Tadayoshi Kohno, Stephen Checkoway,
Damon McCoy, Brian Kantor, Danny Anderson, Hovav Shacham, et al. Experimental security analysis of a
modern automobile. In IEEE S&P, 2010.
34Kyong-Tak Cho and Kang G Shin. Viden: Attacker identification on in-vehicle networks. CCS’17.
35Mert D Pesé, Troy Stacer, C Andrés Campos, Eric Newberry, Dongyao Chen, and Kang G Shin. LibreCAN:
Automated CAN Message Translator. CCS’19.
36Colin Urquhart, Xavier Bellekens, Christos Tachtatzis, Robert Atkinson, Hanan Hindy, and Amar Seeam.
Cyber-Security Internals of a Skoda Octavia vRS: A Hands on Approach. IEEE Access, 7:146057–146069, 2019.
37Daniel Frassinelli, Sohyeon Park, and Stefan Nürnberger. I know where you parked last summer:
Automated reverse engineering and privacy analysis of modern cars. In IEEE S&P 2020.
38Riadul Islam and Rafi Ud Daula Refat. Improving CAN bus security by assigning dynamic arbitration IDs.
Journal of Transportation Security, 2020.
39Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek. A survey of remote automotive attack surfaces. Black Hat USA, 2014.
40Jose Pagliery. https://money.cnn.com/2014/03/31/technology/security/tesla-hack/, 2014.
41CBS. Hacked in 60 minutes. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/car-hacked-on-60-minutes/, 2015.
42More information on certificates in Section 5.3.
43"TLS is not mandatory for certain Identification Modes other than the Plug-and-Charge Identification
Mode", from ISO15118-2:2014 (revised and reconfirmed in 2020).
44TLS is a well studied suite of security protocols widely used in the Internet, whose most popular network
model is TCP/IP. TLS is implemented at the application layer of TCP/IP.
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ISO 1511845 is organised in parts. Comparable parts with CHAdeMO are summarised in
Table 5.1 and overlaid on top of the Open System Interconnection model (OSI) as specified
in the ISO 15118 documentations, Figure 5.2. OSI is the traditional model of reference for
communication46; the table also shows the TCP/IP protocol suite as it is the most commonly
used in the Internet.
It is worth noting that the ISO 15118 documentation places the TLS protocol at the transport
layer, However, TLS is a protocol that comes on top of the transport layer47.













































Table 5.1: Comparison of standards for CHAdeMO (IEC 61851) and ISO 15118.
Energy transfer Communication
Wired Wireless Wired Wireless
CHAdeMO IEC 61851-23 – IEC 61851-24 –
ISO 15118 ISO 15118-3,1,2 ISO 15118-8,1,2 ISO 15118-3 ISO 15118-8
45Smart Charging Webinar: Dr Marc Mültin, Meet ISO 15118 - https://youtu.be/Pso_8r7a-vM
46Hubert Zimmermann. OSI reference model-the ISO model of architecture for open systems interconnec-
tion. IEEE Transactions on communications, 28(4):425–432, 1980
47Eric Rescorla and Tim Dierks. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2. 2008 - pg. 4.
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5.1.3 Security of Proprietary protocols: the example of Tesla
Tesla built their own alternative for high-level communication between electric vehicle and
charging station. The charger uses a protocol over the CAN bus, as found out by hacks in
reverse engineering fashion48. Perhaps the most known vulnerability of Tesla is from Nie
et al.49 They describe how they managed to inject malicious messages into the CAN bus
passing through the wireless communication, exploiting an anomaly in the gateway that
is connected to both the Ethernet and the CAN bus. Their attack was very serious as they
could gain remote control of the car. Interestingly, the vulnerability assessed by Nie et al.
has been answered with an update from Tesla in only 10 days.
5.2 Back-end Protocols: Charger to third party operators
5.2.1 OCPP
The Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP)50 defines communication protocols between
chargers and central management systems and it is becoming the de facto standard. Up to
version 1.6, security was somehow overlooked, but the Open Charge Alliance published a
security White Paper to complement the protocol applying the security of version 2.0 to 1.6-
J51. OCPP v2.0.x includes secure firmware updates, security logging and event notification,
and security profiles for authentication and secure communication. OCPP uses TLS to
achieve security, and explicitly design key management for client-side certificates. OCPP
2.0 supports ISO 15118, smart charging and PnC functionalities. Using a combination of OCPP
2.0 and ISO 15118 with TLS would ensure a secure communication between EVs, chargers and
central management systems.
5.2.2 IEEE 2030.5
The IEEE 2030.552 standard is a suite of communication protocols to connect and directly
control devices. Its design is oriented and optimised for home area network devices.
48Kevin Mahaey. Hacking a Tesla Model S: What we found and what we learned. https://blog.lookout.
com/hacking-a-tesla, 2015.
49Sen Nie, Ling Liu, and Yuefeng Du. Free-fall: Hacking Tesla from wireless to CAN bus. Black Hat USA, 2017.
50Smart Charging Webinar: Robert de Leeuw, Meet OCPP - https://youtu.be/TT1R5lqVlLQ
51https://www.openchargealliance.org/news/enhanced-security-for-ocpp-16/
52Smart Charging Webinar: Gordon Lum, Meet IEEE 2030.5 Smart Energy Profile 2.0 SEP2 - https://youtu.
be/CQsTXIt90YY
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Relating to the V2G ecosystem, it allows communication between any of the most
relevant entities: aggregators, home-smart devices, chargers, EV (includes EV-charger
communication).
We particularly note that IEEE 2030.5 put security as a priority in their design, especially
if compared to their predecessors or standards they build on top of (e.g. IEC 61850). To
authenticate entities, IEEE 2030.5 describes life-long certificates and does not cope with
EV mobility (after all, the home EV charger is not currently shared with strangers). IEEE
2030.5 does not support a PKI: they actually go the opposite direction and provide life-long
certificates that cannot be updated or revoked53 and must be known privately. Thus, despite
its strong security guidelines (e.g. follow NIST guidelines for encrypting communications
using cipher suite.), it might not be easy to extend it to support a large scale deployment
of an EV charging infrastructure (i.e. the protocol focus on communication of the devices in
a small area (house or buildings) so a PKI infrastructure wasn’t used, although it would be
needed to extend to regional and national scale connected infrastructure.
5.2.3 OpenADR
Open Automated Demand Response (OpenADR)54 is an open information exchange model
for distributed energy resources (DERs). Their model typically relies on a gateway device, or
aggregator to translate utility Demand Response (DR) and DER requirements into specific
device behaviours.
OpenADR mandates the usage of TLS for mutual authentication, message integrity and
confidentiality. This may be an issue for devices that have been already manufactured
with limited resources (e.g. insucient computing power or communication bandwidth).
Moreover, their model specifically requires the usage of a PKI, where trusted certificate
authorities (CAs)55 sign certificates for each and all nodes, and authentication is achieved
using those certificates.
OpenADR sees its nodes as virtual nodes (their internal architecture is abstracted) and
this approach is much less direct toward device control than the approach of IEEE 2030.5.
Even if some of the functionality oered by OpenADR and IEEE 2030.5 overlap, one does not
necessarily exclude the other on the same communication network.
53Revocation is a very important feature! For example, due to a bug discovered on TLS in 2014, a
considerably large number of aected websites needed to revoke and reissue their certificates.
54Smart Charging Webinar: Rolf Bienert & guests, Meet OpenADR - https://youtu.be/9EG0HmHmjV0.
55More information on CAs in Section 5.3.
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5.2.4 EEBus
EEBus56 is a suite of protocols that aim to harmonise communications in the Internet of
Things (IoT) and has been adopted by many companies; in particular, they focus on the data
structure and communication exchanged between entities. They specify several protocols at
dierent layers of communication: the SPINE protocol at the application layer (if compared
to the OSI model) and the SHIP protocol at the network layer. SPINE is security-agnostic,
i.e. does not consider security if not for the trust that entities are supposed to have with
each other to exchange data in the first place. To achieve security, SPINE can be run
over SHIP, which uses TLS and aims to provide a secure TCP/IP-based solution. As such,
EEBus is suitable to run over the Internet and can be, in principle, used for the secure
communications of EV charging infrastructure.
EEBus is open and free to the public 57, and it does not yet provide a royalty-free
implementation (i.e. the specification is free but the actual implementation(i.e. the code)
is not freely available. 58.
5.3 Public Key Infrastructure
The communication infrastructure required for the V2G ecosystem to be enacted is similar
to the Internet, where we already securely exchange confidential messages, sign documents,
and authenticate users and companies with the aid of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
We discussed several communication protocols required to link various entities in the EV
ecosystem and a PKI is a key component for the secure implementation of some of these
protocols (e.g. ISO15118-20; OCPP 2.0; OpenADR). The following paragraphs briefly introduce
the general concepts behind PKI, then a PKI in the context of the EV ecosystem.
First, we briefly describe the basic cryptographic structures59 at the basis of PKIs in order
to secure systems (i.e. to ensure confidentiality and authentication). The mathematical
instruments provided by cryptography include enciphering algorithms, key agreement
algorithms and signature algorithms. They provide a sound technical basis for constructing
secure communications; on this basis, their widespread deployment across multiple
administrative real-world domains requires more work (e.g. PKI).
56Smart Charging Webinar: Dr Maren Fiege, EEBUS Initiative e.V. & Gerhard Paris, Audi AG, Meet EEBUS, EV
charging and more - https://youtu.be/GJXMs3wSpOg
57Freely accessible specifications: https://www.eebus.org/
58https://medium.com/grandcentrix/will-microsoft-joining-eebus-finally-bring-us-an-open-source-reference-implementation-3432a93dd2e6
59Fall, K.R. and Stevens, W.R., 2011. TCP/IP illustrated, volume 1: The protocols. Addison-Wesley; Khan
Academy-Cryptographyhttps://www.khanacademy.org/computing/computers-and-internet; Smart Charging
Webinar: Nadim Kobeissi, Modern Cryptography in the Context of Electric Vehicles - https://youtu.be/
YgdL50HgWU8
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Encryption algorithms can be based either on symmetric keys or on asymmetric keys. A key
is a particular sequence of bits required to perform encryption or decryption operations.
Without the right decryption key, it becomes extremely dicult to retrieve the plaintext of a
given ciphertext.
Symmetric-key cryptography is also called private-key cryptography as one private key that
can be used for both encryption and decryption is generated. Exchanging the key between
entities requires a private channel.
Asymmetric-key cryptography is also called public-key cryptography, as public keys are
generated along private keys. The public key can be used in encryption algorithms by
anybody, and there is no need to exchange keys through private channels. As a drawback,
public-key algorithms are computationally more expensive than private-key algorithms;
consequently, most systems today use hybrid cryptosystems, where an initial expensive
private channel is established with public key to securely share a symmetric key, which will
be used for lightweight communication.
Modern cryptography bases the identity of entities (e.g. banks) on their public keys:
a genuine entity can mathematically prove that they are the intended entity of the
communication by demonstrating (without revealing) that they hold the private key
corresponding to the public one.
As the name suggests, public keys are not kept secret. Once a message is encrypted with
a public key, only the holder of the private key related to that public key can decrypt
the cyphertext. Conversely, encrypting a message with a private key will allow anybody
to inspect the plaintext, along being (mathematically) certain of the authenticity of the
message, as only the owner of the private key could have produced the encrypted message:
this is the principle behind digital signatures. Digitally signing messages60 with the private
key of the sender, then encrypting the resulting message with the public key of the receiver
can oer both authenticity and confidentiality.
As the communication flows through insecure channels, there is no guarantee that the
public key received from the channel is the right one in the first place, as it might have been
tampered with by an attacker. One way to solve this is for devices to store a list of trusted
entities, called Certificate Authorities (CAs). CAs store certificates, which bind entities to
unique public keys61. Certificates are securely deposited into CAs, which are trusted servers.
So to identify themselves, entities (e.g. banks, websites) publish their certificates; any user
can automatically verify the certificate against CAs, as shown in Figure 5.3 for the example of
a connection between an EV and a charger.
CAs are part of a service/trust framework responsible for creating, revoking, distributing,
and updating key pairs and certificates. We denote any such framework as a Public-Key
60In pair with the receiver’s identity to avoid subtle attacks.
61CAs do not hold other entities’ private keys
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Infrastructure (PKI)62. In essence, the users do not need to hold all certificates, but only
carry certificates belonging to CAs; then the users can query CAs for any secure connection
they need to establish with authenticated entities.
Generally, the end-users are not known to CAs and need other explicit ways to be
authenticated. So for example, an account holder needs to use a password, a secret code,
or a fingerprint to be authenticated by their bank, whereas the bank uses one certificate







e The security of the public key cryptography relies on the complexity for an adversarial
entity to reconstruct the private key even knowing the corresponding public key.
Complexity guarantees that the amount of time that the adversary would need to crack
the private key can be increased by increasing a security parameter, i.e. the bit length
of the key. Common security parameters, e.g. 2048-bit keys, are estimated to require
several centuries to succeed for an attacker with all computing power in the world
focused on cracking one key with known methodology.
We briefly described keys and PKI, we now look at the EV ecosystem. The main PKI
deployment in the EV ecosystem is with the Plug&Charge (PnC) seamless service described
by ISO 15118. Hubject has been operating the ISO15118 Plug&Charge for some years but
it has been announced (circa Q2 2021) that CharIN e.V. will be managing its PKI instead
and aiming for a Europe-wide rollout63. Plug&Charge aims for automated authentication,
authorisation and billing of the charging event. With the aid of a PKI, the only action
required by the driver to charge their car is to connect the car to the charger and no
62Not every PKI requires central trusted CAs (e.g. web of trust), but the CA-based PKI here described is
the most common over the Internet. More details can be found in the popular textbook: Katz, Jonathan, and
Yehuda Lindell. Introduction to modern cryptography. CRC press, 2020.
63https://www.charin.global/news/plug-and-charge-europe-enabled-by-charin-is-soon-to-be-rolled-out/
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Figure 5.4: Example of proposed PKI architecture & governance model for an industry, such
as the EV ecosystem. Adapted from: Mike Nelson, DigiCert & Oscar Marcia, Eonti Inc. -




































offline online sub-CAs end-entity certificates
additional authentication methods are needed (e.g. no RFID card, no signing through a
phone App, etc.). For the PnC service to work, the car (at the very least64) needs to have
a registered certificate. This is a challenge as the CAs are supposed to store a sensibly
higher amount of certificates65. Moreover, other desirable properties add up to the overall
complexity, e.g. expiration, suspension and revocation of certificates, or trustability of
CAs (transparency, security, availability and constant audits for compliance with security
industry standards).
Designing a PKI for the current number of EVs is as easy as using the existing PKI over
the Internet, i.e. registering a certificate for any entity that needs to be authenticated.
However, designing a PKI that scales (more than 1 billion cars are currently hitting the road)
is non-trivial and needs to take into account the dierent context and requirements of the
EV charging infrastructure: the high mobility of vehicles, diversity of charging protocols
and outlets, compliance to local and international restrictions and policies, and the high
number of overall certificates to be stored (to have seamless functionality, as PnC). A recent
project assessed the PKI described in ISO 15118 and how it could be improved66. Moreover,
a dedicated research project by SAE is on-going67. SAE is working with mobility and security
experts to drive the creation and operation of a common worldwide EV charging industry
PKI. It is worth noting (circa 2020) that core team members of the SAE project don’t include
grid operators. Other PKI work for EV charging is done by ElaadNL who proposed PKI
designs compatible with ISO 15118 and coexisting with a peer-to-peer PKI68.
Figure 5.4 illustrates an example of a proposed PKI architecture and governance model for
an industry, which can be used for the EV ecosystem. This is a simple 2-tier architecture
with one oine root CA as the trust anchor but, if implemented correctly, could provide
64ISO 15118 outlines a PKI where 5 entities are required to have a certificate.
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extensive security measures for a complex industry involving several entities such as the
EV ecosystem. What ensures the success of a PKI is a good governance model behind the
infrastructure and technology. The Policy Authority (PA) and the Managing Authority (MA)
provide the governance and policy framework for this system. Borrowing an example from
the aviation industry (e.g. AeroMACS), the PA acts as an advisory council to the MA, and it
is made up of aviation administrations from several regions (i.e. Eurocontrol, Civil Aviation
Administration of China and the US Federal Aviation Administration). In addition to taking
input from the PA, there are several working groups that inform the work of the MA. These
working groups come together and look at technical requirement of the system. There is
also certification testing for devices to ensure they are compliant to the agreed standards.
All of this feeds into the certificate policy that governs the PKI 69.
The design of a PKI for EV charging infrastructure, including smart charging and V2G, can
build on top of the existing technology used for the secure functioning of the Internet and
other domains (e.g. banking industry, airport operations). It should also build on top of
on-going PKI work for EV charging infrastructure. However, additional work is required to
ensure the PKI is protocol neutral, extensible, scalable, and crucially enabling for smart
charging and V2G use cases.
We envision that mobility and energy industries in the UK would collaborate together to
design a PKI dedicated for EV charging. Crucially, it is key that UK stakeholders participate
in on-going European and International eorts on the topic, as to the best of our knowledge
we have not noticed their participation.
69Smart Charging Webinar: Mike Nelson, DigiCert & Oscar Marcia, Eonti Inc., Public Key Infrastructure for
Electric Vehicles - https://youtu.be/nEBJzPVZNd0, see Figure 5.4
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